Ideas from 'Properties' by Chris Swoyer [2000], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy' (ed/tr Stanford University) [plato.stanford.edu ,-]].

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4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / e. Iterative sets

10405

In the iterative conception of sets, they form a natural hierarchy

5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form

10407

Logical Form explains differing logical behaviour of similar sentences

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience

10421

Supervenience is nowadays seen as between properties, rather than linguistic

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism

10410

Anti-realists can't explain different methods to measure distance

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties

10416

Can properties have parts?

10399

If a property such as self-identity can only be in one thing, it can't be a universal

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 5. Natural Properties

10417

There are only first-order properties ('red'), and none of higher-order ('coloured')

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets

10413

The best-known candidate for an identity condition for properties is necessary coextensiveness

8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals

10402

Various attempts are made to evade universals being wholly present in different places

8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 4. Concept Nominalism

10400

Conceptualism says words like 'honesty' refer to concepts, not to properties

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / a. Nature of abstracta

10403

If properties are abstract objects, then their being abstract exemplifies being abstract

10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds

10406

One might hope to reduce possible worlds to properties

12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique

10404

Extreme empiricists can hardly explain anything

18. Thought / C. Content / 8. Intension

10408

Intensions are functions which map possible worlds to sets of things denoted by an expression

18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / e. Concepts from exemplars

10409

Research suggests that concepts rely on typical examples

19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates

10401

The F and G of logic cover a huge range of natural language combinations

19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense

10420

Maybe a proposition is just a property with all its places filled

26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory

10412

If laws are mere regularities, they give no grounds for future prediction

26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism

10411

Two properties can have one power, and one property can have two powers